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Abstract
	 The	overthrow	of	the	Shah	Reza	Pahlavi’s	monarchy	in	1979,	allowed	the	emergence	of	a	hybrid	regime	
in	which	the	precepts	and	standards	of	12th	Imam	Shiite	Muslim	clerics	prevail	along	with	republican	
institutions.	The	new	political	regime	incorporated	a	new	internal	order	endowed	with	elective	and	non-
elective	 institutions,	 in	which	often	 the	boundary	between	 the	secular	and	 the	 religious	cannot	be	
distinguished.	Explaining	Iran’s	foreign	policy	raises	an	immediate	question:	is	Iran’s	foreign	policy	based	
on	purely	geopolitical	and	geostrategic	interests,	 through	a	realist	paradigm,	or	is	 it,	simultaneously	or	
distinctively,	shaped	by	an	idealistic	element	related	to	Islam?	It	is	legitimate	to	question	whether	there	is	
an	Islamic	way	of	conducting	a	foreign	policy	and	what	distinguishes	Iran’s	actions	from	secular	states	in	
international	politics.	The	balance	of	ideology	and	pragmatism	seems	to	be	one	of	the	most	persistent	and	
intricate	elements	of	the	Islamic	Republic’s	foreign	policy.	This	is	one	of	the	most	important	features	to	
consider	when	developing	a	conceptual	and	analytical	framework	to	explain	two	apparently	conflicting	
elements	in	the	Iranian	foreign	policy.
Keywords : 	foreign	policy,	idealism,	Iran,	national	interest,	pan-islamism,	realism,	secularism,	theocracy,	
12th	imam	shi’ism
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1.	 The	Roots	of	Iranian	Foreign	Policy
1.1	 The	Geopolitical	context
	 The	search	for	a	causal	relationship	between	geographical	factors	and	their	impact	on	polity	dates	back	to	the	
ancient	world.	With	Aristotle	in	ancient	Greece	emerged	the	study	of	the	relationship	between	the	physical	
environment	and	social	and	political	units.	To	study	the	foreign	policy	of	a	nation	may	well	 involve	 the	
observation	of	how	certain	representations	of	the	geographic	space	are	incorporated	in	its	 implementation.	
The	identification	of	a	geographical	space	and	it’s	labeling	produces	a	number	of	ideas	and	views	about	that	
same	place	and	the	policies	pursued	there.	Thus	characterizing	a	particular	geographic	region	as	“Islamic”	or	
“Western”	implies	that	when	a	state	defines	its	foreign	policy	towards	it,	this	will	be	based	on	those	views	or	
ideas	(Agnew,	1995,	pp.47-48).	
	 The	actors	of	International	Relations	legitimize	its	foreign	policy	by	presenting	certain	ideas	or	assumptions	
about	states	and	regions	beyond	its	borders.	These	ideas	can	be	called	“Geopolitical	Visions,”	which	are	any	
idea	about	the	relationship	between	the	geographical	location	of	a	state	and	other	places,	and	that	involves	
ideas	of	(in)	security,	(dis)	advantage	and/or	invoking	ideas	about	a	collective	mission	or	a	foreign	policy	
strategy	(Dijkink,	1996,	p.10).	These	assumptions	will	emerge	from	the	political	elites	of	a	given	society.	
Societies	are	pluralistic	in	the	vast	majority,	including	dictatorships.	There	isn’t	only	one	faction	of	the	elites	
who	determines	what	the	state	is	and	what	role	it	has	in	the	world.	The	state	is	a	social	construction,	so	its	
internal	and	external	actions	are	subject	 to	different	 interpretations/	visions.	This	pluralism	is	not	always	
evident	 in	 the	foreign	policy	formulation,	as	 the	will	of	a	faction	can	impose	 itself	on	others.	Moreover,	
sometimes	 the	definition	of	a	 line	of	external	action	 is	 limited	by	a	predetermined	pattern	of	action	by	
decisions/choices	made	 in	 the	past	–	path	dependence	–	which	ends	up	being	 imposed	on	other	players,	
limiting	their	ability	to	choose	and	take	decisions.	Campbell	called	“geographical	imagination”	as	the	way	in	
which	the	influential	groups	in	the	cultural	 life	of	one	state	define	this	same	state	and	nation	in	the	world.	
Campbell	also	discusses	the	primary	actions	of	identification	and	formation	of	boundaries	in	which	the	groups	
of	population	within	a	State	are	committed	(Campbell,	1998,	p.80).
	 The	geographic	imagination	is	the	foundation	of	the	“geopolitical	culture”	of	a	state.	This	is	the	product	of	
cultural	and	organizational	processes	that	shape	the	State’s	foreign	policy.	But	the	geopolitical	culture	within	
the	State	itself	is	not	homogeneous	and	is	based	on	different	political	and	economic	interests,	which	are	the	
result	of	different	views	that	emerge	from	the	political	elites	of	that	same	State.	This	geopolitical	culture	is	
also	characterized	by	“geopolitical	traditions,”	which	are	the	historical	canon	of	thought	under	the	identity	of	
the	State,	of	foreign	policy	and	national	interest	(Ó’Tuathail,	2004,	p.88).	
	 During	the	last	200	years,	the	Iranian	geopolitical	visions	have	been	influenced	by	diverse	experiences	that	
resulted	from	consecutive	foreign	interventions.	During	the	19th	century,	the	Tobacco	Revolt	(1881-1882)	was	
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followed	by	the	Revolt	of	the	Qajars	having	made	concessions	to	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	tobacco	industry.	
Mirza	Hassan	Shirazi,	the	marja-e taqlid or	the	grand ayatollah,	issued	an	edict	that	forbade	any	Shia	Muslim	
to	smoke	tobacco	in	Iran.	Due	to	strong	pressure	from	the	population,	the	Government	finally	withdrew	these	
concessions	(Keddie,	1966).	However,	from	the	observed	external	influence	during	this	period	and	due	to	the	
concessions	of	 the	Qajar	dynasty	 to	foreign	powers	resulted	 the	Constitutional	Revolution	of	1905-1911	
(Afari,	1996).	Later	in	the	early	1950’s,	Prime	Minister	Mohammad	Mosaddeq	created	the	nationalizations	
movement,	putting	under	Iranian	control	English	oil	companies	and	the	Anglo-Iranian	companies.	Mosaddeq	
was	later	removed	from	power	through	a	coup	in	1953	orchestrated	by	Mohammad	Reza	Shah,	in	cooperation	
with	the	American	and	British	intelligence	(Katouzian,	1990).	Finally,	the	Iranian	Islamic	Revolution	of	1979	
can	also	be	explained	through	Iran’s	reaction	to	the	domination	by	foreign	powers	and	consequent	exploration	
of	its	wealth	and	resources.
	 The	aforementioned	events	are	also	related	to	the	Iranian	historical	experience	through	the	competition	with	
other	empires	or	nations,	e.g.	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	the	interference	of	foreign	powers	during	the	past	200	
years	(Russia,	France,	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States)	(Eshraghi,	1984,	pp.27-52).	The	Iranians	
were	also	permeable	by	several	attempts	of	modernization,	starting	in	the	19th	century	with	Qajar	Shah,	and	
after	 the	disintegration	of	 the	Persian	Empire	with	 the	 two	Pahlavi	Shahs	 (Reza	Shah	1921-41	and	
Mohammad	Reza	Shah	1941-79)	(Bamani,	1961).
	 In	addition,	 the	geopolitical	culture	 in	 Iran	has	been	 influenced	by	 the	duality	between	 the	 Islamic	
community	and	the	nation-state.	The	question	is	whether	the	Iranians	must	be	identified	with	the	Ummah	(the	
Islamic	community),	as	was	proclaimed	by	Ayatollah	Khomeini,	or	with	Iran	as	a	nation	State,	such	as	the	
former	Presidents	Rafsanjani	and	Khatami	saw	it.	These	two	views	are	part	of	the	“geopolitical	imagination”	
of	different	Iranian	political	elites	(Rakel,	2009,	p.22).
	 The	geopolitical	visions	of	Khomeini	are	manifested	essentially	through	two	ideological	principles	of	the	
Islamic	revolution	related	with	an	international	dimension:	“neither	the	West	nor	the	East”	(non-alignment)	
and	the	“export	of	the	revolution.”	These	principles	involve	the	cooling	of	relations	with	Western	countries	
and	the	support	for	Muslims	in	any	part	of	the	globe.	On	the	contrary,	those	who	see	Iran	as	a	nation-state,	
consider	the	country	as	a	major	player	in	international	relations,	promoting	good	relations	with	the	West	and	
with	neighboring	States.	The	definition	of	nation-state	in	Iran	is	intimately	connected	with	the	definition	of	the	
boundaries	of	the	Iranian	territory	and	neighboring	countries,	which	led	to	frequent	conflicts	(Rakel,	2009,	
p.22-23).	The	permeability	of	its	borders	could	explain	the	interventionist	nature	of	the	152nd	article	of	the	
Iranian	Constitution,	as	well	as	 the	priority	of	 the	regional	over	 the	international	dimension	in	its	foreign	
policy.
	 Iran	has	a	unique	geographical	location.	Of	all	countries	in	the	world,	Iran	has	the	largest	number	of	borders	
with	neighboring	countries	 (currently	15).	This	 fact	had	a	 significant	 influence	on	 the	economic	and	
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diplomatic	relations	with	the	adjacent	countries.	A	recent	example	is	the	legal	dispute	about	the	Caspian	Sea	
regime,	involving	apart	from	Iran,	Russia,	Azerbaijan,	Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan.	Another	example	is	the	
dispute	with	the	United	Arab	Emirates	(UAE)	over	the	island	of	Abu	Musa	and	the	Tunb	Islands	(Mojtahed-
Zadeh,	2006,	p.90).
	 Being	situated	in	a	region	of	great	 instability	has	been	difficult	 for	Iran.	This	widespread	condition	of	
instability	still	persists	today,	either	through	the	sectarian	conflict	in	the	western	flank	of	Iran,	with	Iraq	or	
with	the	fragile	states	on	the	eastern	border:	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan.	There	are	also	some	states	along	the	
northern	border	of	 Iran,	whose	political,	 social	and	economic	 transformations	gave	rise	 to	a	climate	of	
instability	and	 insecurity	 in	Central	Asia	and	 the	Caucasus.	Regional	security	depends	on	authoritarian	
regimes,	which	lie	 to	 the	South,	subject	 to	socio-political	changes	 in	 the	future.	Such	an	environment	of	
insecurity	 fuels	 regional	 rivalries,	military	conflicts	or	crises,	and	at	 the	same	 time	promotes	a	greater	
presence	and	direct	involvement	of	major	foreign	powers.	Most	of	Iran’s	economic	and	political	assets	are	
being	spent	 in	combating	these	threats.	The	Iranian	leadership’s	determination	to	maintain	a	skilled	army	
reflects	national	security	concerns	as	a	result	of	 this	geopolitical	context	 (Barzegar,	2010,	p.134).	 Iran’s	
foreign	policy	is	therefore	reduced	to	a	regional	dimension,	floating	between	achieving	the	leadership	of	the	
region	and	maintaining	the	status	quo	or	some	kind	of	autarchy.
	 The	geopolitical	culture	in	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	seems	to	be	the	result	of	past	experiences,	such	as	the	
intervention	of	foreign	powers	and	issues	of	identity	and	territorial	boundaries.	After	the	Islamic	Revolution,	
Iran’s	geopolitical	culture	manifested	itself	in	the	institutionalization	of	the	Velayat-e Faqih,	as	was	developed	
by	Ayatollah	Khomeini	 in	the	1960’s.	The	rivalry	between	different	political	factions	in	the	context	of	the	
struggle	for	power	also	influenced	the	practices	related	to	Iranian	foreign	policy.	Each	faction	has	a	vision	
about	polity,	economy,	social	and	cultural	affairs.	These	visions	and	interests	have	changed	over	time	and	
consequently	each	faction	has	developed	different	views	about	Iran’s	place	in	the	world	and	international	
relations	(Rakel,	2009,	p.24).	
	 Since	the	revolution,	the	Iranian	political	elite	has	faced	the	challenge	of	balancing	between	idealism	and	
pragmatism,	 two	approaches	of	Iranian	foreign	policymaking.	Gradually,	 the	Iranian	leadership	has	been	
emphasizing	 the	geopolitical	 factor	 in	 the	conduct	of	 foreign	policy.	Since	 the	advent	of	 the	 Islamic	
revolution,	Iran’s	regional	policies	have	been	driven	by	ideology	but	also	by	geopolitical	factors,	especially	on	
the	relations	with	other	states	of	the	region.	The	main	reason	for	the	importance	of	geopolitics	in	the	definition	
of	Iranian	foreign	policy	lies	 in	 the	nature	of	 the	challenges	faced	by	Iran.	These	are	marked	by	multiple	
sources	of	 insecurity,	 including	 the	American	military	 threat	or	 Israel.	These	conditions	 require	 the	
development	of	 Iran’s	strategic	alliances.	When	considering	 the	Iranian	geopolitical	 reality,	 its	cultural,	
religious	and	ethnic	characteristics,	Iranian	national	security	is	without	any	doubt	linked	to	the	rest	of	 the	
region	(Barzegar,	2010,	p.145).	
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1.2	 The	Identitarian	and	Cultural	Context
	 To	better	understand	Iran’s	foreign	policy	a	deeper	analysis	of	the	identitarian	and	cultural	context	of	the	
Iranian	foreign	policy	is	necessary.	With	regard	to	Iran,	the	past	seems	to	be	always	present.	We	can	observe	a	
paradoxical	combination	of	pride	in	the	Iranian	culture	and	a	sense	of	victimization,	which	also	created	a	
fierce	sense	of	 independence	and	a	culture	of	resistance	to	domination	by	any	foreign	power.	The	Iranian	
foreign	policy	is	deeply	rooted	and	widely	held	within	these	feelings	(Ramazani,	2010,	p.12).
	 At	the	dawn	of	the	Iranian	revolution,	Ayatollah	Ruhollah	Khomeini	called	for	“independence,	freedom,	and	
the	Islamic	Republic.”	Thus	were	declared	the	Iranian	inalienable	rights.	Before,	the	Americans	had	done	the	
same	with	“life,	liberty,	and	the	pursuit	of	happiness,”	or	the	French	with	the	commitment	to	“liberty,	equality	
and	fraternity.”	Khomeini’s	principles	last	to	the	present	day,	although	the	“non-alignment”	is	not	anymore	
considered	in	the	post-Cold	War	period.	These	principles	were	also	incorporated	in	the	Iranian	Constitution,	
and	Khatami,	during	his	presidency	underlined	their	“eternal”	(Javidan)	characteristics	(Ramazani,	2008,	p.1).
	 The	study	of	these	principles,	as	well	as	its	cultural	and	historical	context,	can	deepen	our	understanding	of	
the	interactions	between	the	external	and	internal	policies	since	the	Iranian	revolution.	The	Iranians	value	the	
influence	of	Zoroastrianism	on	Judaism,	Christianity	and	Islam.	They	are	proud	of	their	thirty	centuries	of	art	
and	artifacts	and	on	the	continuity	of	their	cultural	identity	over	millennia,	which	created	the	first	state	of	the	
world,	more	than	2500	years	ago.	From	Iran	the	first	 international	society	was	organized,	where	different	
religions	and	cultures	of	people	under	their	domain	were	respected.	The	Iranians	also	pride	themselves	for	
having	freed	the	Jews	from	Babylonian	captivity,	and	have	influenced	the	Greeks,	Arabs,	Mongols,	and	Turks,	
not	to	mention	the	influence	on	Western	culture	indirectly	through	contributions	to	the	Islamic	civilization.	At	
the	same	time,	 the	Iranians	feel	oppressed	by	foreign	powers	 throughout	 its	history,	e.g.	Greeks,	Arabs,	
Mongols,	Turks,	and	more	recently,	the	forces	of	Saddam	Hussein	who	invaded	Iran.	The	Iranians	also	recall	
that	the	British	Empire	and	the	Russians	both	exploited	the	country	economically	and	subjugated	it	politically,	
invading	and	occupying	the	territory	during	both	world	wars.	The	fact	 that	 the	United	States	has	aborted	
Iranian	democratic	aspirations	in	1953,	toppling	the	Government	of	Prime	Minister	Muhammad	Musaddeq,	
returning	the	autocracy	of	the	Shah	to	the	throne	and,	subsequently,	ruled	the	country	for	a	quarter	century,	is	
deeply	etched	in	the	Iranian	collective	memory.	Similarly,	just	as	the	American	overthrow	of	Musaddeq	was	
recorded	on	 the	 conscience	of	 Iran,	 the	Tehran	American	hostage	 in	1979	 is	 still	 part	 of	American	
consciousness	and	perception	about	Iran.	Relations	between	Tehran	and	Washington	have	been	shaped	not	
only	by	a	mutual	psychological	 trauma,	but	also	by	the	collective	memory	of	70	years	of	friendly	relations	
(Ramazani,	2010,	p.12).	
	 Cyrus	 the	Great	 (558-530	BC)	 initiated	 the	 search	 for	 independence	 and	 freedom	 in	 its	 gradual	
metamorphosis	into	ideals	and	principles	in	the	world.	The	State	born	by	his	hands	grew	during	30	years,	
forming	 the	Achaemenid	and	 the	Persian	Empire.	The	 Iranian	cultural	 identity	 is	 so	 ingrained	 in	 the	
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consciousness	of	a	common	origin,	a	shared	religion	and	language,	which	survived	the	Arab	invasions	and	
other	occupations,	as	well	as	human	and	material	devastation,	and	the	conversion	to	Islam	that	followed.	After	
300	years	of	Arab	invasions,	this	sense	of	identity	was	expressed	eloquently	through	the	heroic	epics	of	the	
Iranian	poet	Ferdowsi,	which	underlined	the	30	years	needed	to	purge	the	Arab	from	the	Persian	language	
(Ramazani,	2008,	pp.2-4).
	 The	Islamic	era	in	Persian	territory	emerged	with	the	Safavid	Empire,	replacing	Zoroastrianism	by	Shi’a	
Islam	as	the	religion	of	the	Empire.	Like	the	Sassanids	and	Zoroastrianism	in	the	past,	there	was	also	a	close	
relationship	between	political	power	and	religious	power	(the	throne	and	the	altar)	with	 the	Safavids	and	
Shi’ism.	In	practice,	the	Safavids	used	Shi’a	Islam	to	legitimize	and	consolidate	power	and	to	justify	incessant	
wars	against	enemies,	e.g.	the	Sunni	Ottoman	Empire.	The	result	of	these	wars,	together	with	persistent	social	
problems,	corruption	in	the	royal	household	and	the	misinterpretation	of	religion,	culminated	with	the	fall	of	
the	Empire	in	1722	(Ramazani,	2008,	p.3).	
	 The	Iranian	State	only	managed	to	reemerge	at	the	beginning	of	the	19th	century,	however,	now	entangled	
with	the	European	powers	competition	for	his	territory.	The	historical	processes	of	the	19th	and	early	20th	
century	revolutionized	the	pre-modern	ideas	of	independence	and	freedom	in	Iran.	Three	factors	in	particular	
sparked	this	historical	metamorphosis:	1)	the	imposed	reduction	of	international	borders	by	foreign	powers;	2)	
the	semi-colonization	of	the	state	and	the	society;	and	3)	the	spread	of	democratic,	nationalist,	reformist	and	
modernist	 thinking.	 In	 response	 to	 this	movement	 the	anti-democratic	Governments	of	Reza	Shah	and	
Mohammad	Reza	Shah	emerged.	The	Pahlavi	kings	tried	to	match	their	autocratic	regimes	with	pre-Islamic	
conceptions	and	an	aura	of	modern	secularism.	(Ramazani,	2008,	p.4-7).
	 From	Khomeini	has	emerged	a	dimension	of	basic	principles	 in	Islamic	Iran	along	with	revolutionary	
principles.	This	rejected	what	he	called	to	“idolize	the	nation”	and	justified	the	prefix	“democratic”	to	the	
Islamic	Republic,	based	on	the	thought	that	the	Islamic	democracy	is	superior	to	other	existing	democracies	in	
the	world.	In	fact,	Khomeini	also	rejected	the	post	Westphalia	paradigm,	considering	that	 the	international	
system	of	nation-states	was	not	a	God	creation	but	one	of	 the	Human	mind.	In	Khomeini’s	 international	
relations	 theory,	all	other	views	of	 the	world,	especially	 the	socialist	and	 the	capitalist,	were	considered	
outdated.	When	he	wrote	 to	 the	Soviet	 leader	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	Khomeini	underlined	 the	 ideological	
vacuum	 that	exists	 in	 the	West	and	 in	 the	East.	He	also	suggested	him	 the	study	of	 the	 Islamic	view.	
Nevertheless	this	Islamic	view	never	overlapped	the	interests	of	the	Islamic	Iranian	state.	The	purchase	of	
arms	to	the	“Great	Satan,”	the	United	States,	during	the	war	with	Iraq,	or	the	acceptance	of	the	UN	resolution	
that	called	for	a	cease-fire	with	the	Iraqis	in	1988,	are	an	example	of	such.	Khomeini	declared	then	that	he	was	
taking	the	necessary	steps	for	the	interest	and	survival	of	the	revolution	(Ramazani,	2008,	p.8).
	 Unlike	the	Western	and	Israeli	representation	of	the	Iranian	foreign	policy	as	“irrational,”	Iran	has	a	tradition	
of	prudent	statism	that	was	developed	through	centuries	of	experience	in	International	Affairs,	beginning	with	
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Cyrus	the	Great	more	than	2,000	years	ago.	Iran	has	committed	many	mistakes	in	his	long	diplomatic	history,	
which	can	serve	as	a	history	 lesson	for	 the	present	 Iranian	political	elite.	 In	 the	post-revolution	period,	
especially	 in	 its	 early	years,	 provocation,	 agitation,	 subversion,	 hostage	 taking	 and	 terrorism	often	
characterized	Iranian	foreign	policy.	More	recently,	Iran’s	international	image	has	been	tarnished	by	a	reckless	
rhetoric	of	President	Mahmoud	Ahmadinejad	on	 Israel	and	 the	Holocaust,	 ignoring	 the	 importance	of	
international	legitimacy	and	the	Islamic	Iranian	dictum	of	Hekmat	(wisdom)	(Ramazani,	2010,	p.13).
	 A	historical	approach	allows	us	to	get	acquainted	with	the	designs	and	the	structuring	principles	that	form	the	
psychological	and	cultural	context	in	which	the	decision-making	process	at	the	level	of	the	foreign	policy	of	a	
state	is	formulated.	As	Cicero	said,	to	remain	ignorant	about	what	happened	before	we	were	born,	is	how	to	
remain	always	like	a	child	(Cicero,	in	Ramazani,	2008,	p.2).	Winston	Churchill	also	said:	“The	further	you	
look	backward,	the	further	forward	you	can	see”	(Churchill,	in	Ramazani,	2008,	p.2).	Similarly,	when	we	look	
at	the	Iranian	past,	the	way	it	shaped	its	culture	and	the	character	of	the	Iranians,	we	can	therefore	perceive	a	
glimpse	of	the	Iranian	policymakers’	thinking	when	formulating	Iran’s	foreign	policy.
2.	 The	Religious	Dimension:	The	12th	Imam	Shiism	and	Iranian	Foreign	Policy	
	 The	basis	of	the	political	system	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	is	the	system	of	the	Velayat-e Faqih,	which	
finds	its	origin	in	the	Shia	tradition,	within	Islam.	Originally,	in	Islam,	there	was	a	distinction	between	the	
state	power	and	religious	thought	(Lambton,	1980,	p.404).	The	Prophet	Muhammad	was	both	temporal	and	
spiritual	leader	of	Islam,	and	established	the	core	principles	of	the	religion.	After	the	death	of	Muhammad,	the	
legitimacy	of	his	successor	has	become	a	dispute	between	the	Sunni	and	Shiite	branches	of	Islam	(Amineh,	
2007,	pp.353-375).
	 Shi’a	Islam	became	politically	institutionalized	in	Iran	when	Shah	Ismail	I	founded	the	Safavid	Empire	and	
adopted	Shi’a	Islam	as	the	official	religion	of	the	State	in	1501.	This	separated	the	empire	and	identified	him	
as	opposed	to	the	Sunni	Ottoman	Empire.	Thus,	since	the	Safavid	Empire,	Shi’ism	has	served	the	construction	
of	Iranian	national	identity	and	state	building	(Thual,	2002,	p.33).	
	 The	politicization	of	Shi’a	Islam	can	be	 traced	from	four	developments:	1)	 the	usuli	 triumph	over	 the	
akhbari;	2)	the	ijtihad;	3)	the	marja-e taqlid;	and	4)	the	khums.	During	the	17th	and	18th	centuries	emerged	a	
theological	debate	between	the	Shiite	clergy	about	 the	right	 to	 interpretation	of	 the	 law,	 the	 ijtihad.	Two	
schools	evolved	from	this	debate,	 the	akhbari	and	 the	usuli.	The	akhbari	 school	believes	 that	since	 the	
disappearance	of	the	12th	Imam,	no	one	could	be	granted	the	right	to	interpretation,	and	the	hadiths (tradition	
of	the	words	and	deeds	of	Muhammad)	were	a	proper	legal	source	for	the	Islamic	jurisprudence.	So	it	would	
not	be	necessary	to	follow	the	interpretations	of	the	higher	clergy,	the	mojtahed	versed	in	the	scriptures.	In	
contrast	with	the	akhbari,	the	usuli	school	believes	in	the	ijtihad	and	the	mojtahed	interpretations.	The	usuli	
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won	the	contest	between	the	two	schools	and	therefore	legitimized	the	formulation	of	policies	in	the	context	
of	Shi’a	Islam	(Keddie,	1995,	pp.97-98).	The	usuli	school’s	victory	over	the	akhbari paved	the	way	for	the	
modernization	of	the	Shiite	clergy	and	the	formation	of	an	autonomous	clerical	state	body.	Only	the	mojtahed	
or	the	ayatollah,	and	later	in	the	19th	century	the	centralized	leadership	of	the	marja-e taqlid,	were	entitled	to	
the	ijtihad	(Roy,	1996/1999,	p.557).
	 The	centralization	of	power	among	the	clergy	was	accompanied	by	financial	centralization	and	autonomy	of	
the	clergy	from	the	State,	through	the	concentration	of	khums	and	zakat	(religious	taxes)	at	the	hands	of	the	
marja-e taqlid.	The	khums	are	an	exclusive	of	Shi’ism.	Originally	representing	1/5	of	the	annual	net	income,	
the	khums	were	paid	to	the	ulamas	(representatives	of	the	clergy)	at	a	local	or	provincial	level.	This	resulted	in	
direct	contact	between	 the	clergy	and	 the	population,	along	with	an	 increasing	political	 influence	of	 the	
traditional	bazaari.	With	 the	emergence	of	 the	marja-e taqlid,	 the	khums	were	concentrated	 in	his	hands	
(Enayat,	1982).
	 Partial	financial	dependence	of	the	clergy	from	the	bazaari	has	prevented	the	Shi’a	clergy	to	support	policies	
that	might	go	against	the	interests	of	the	Iranian	economic	sector.	However,	the	independence	of	the	clergy	
from	the	state	has	been	particularly	important	during	some	periods	of	political	crisis,	as	in	the	case	of	the	
Tobacco	Revolt,	 the	Constitutional	Revolution,	and	 the	Oil	Nationalization	Movement	carried	out	by	
Mosadeqq,	and	finally	during	the	Islamic	Revolution	(Mirbaghari,	2004,	p.557).	The	politicization	of	Shi’ism	
culminated	in	the	years	1960/70,	still	during	the	Iranian	monarchy,	with	the	Constitutional	Revolution	and	the	
post	constitutional	clergy	being	highly	criticized	by	religious	 intellectuals.	Ayatollah	Khomeini	and	Ali	
Shari’ati	are	two	prominent	figures	in	this	context	(Rakel,	2009,	pp.25-26).
	 Khomeini	challenged	the	traditional	Shi’ite	dogma	on	mundane	political	power,	with	his	innovative	ideas	
about	the	Velayat-e Faqih	system.	The	origins	of	 this	system	can	be	found	in	the	discussions	between	the	
akhbari	and	the	usuli school	in	the	18th	century.	It	was	also	Khomeini	that	developed	the	concept	and	made	it	
a	political	project,	institutionalized	in	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	later	on.	Khomeini	not	only	restored	some	
Shi’a	 traditions	but	also	began	an	 ideological	 revolution	within	Shi’a	 Islam.	According	 to	 the	 theory	of	
Velayat-e Faqih,	the	Supreme	Leader	is	the	rightful	leader	of	the	entire	Muslim	community,	the	Umma.	The	
Iranian	Constitution	was	changed	in	1988	giving	larger	powers	to	the	faqih.	This	is	also	know	as	Velayat-e 
Faqih Motlaqah-e Faqih,	the	Supreme	Jurist’s	Absolute	Government,	giving	greater	powers	to	the	Supreme	
Leader	on	all	Muslim	community.	Since	the	Islamic	revolution,	this	system	and	its	basic	principles	have	been	
the	basis	of	 the	power	structure	of	 the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran,	and	at	 the	same	time	one	of	 its	biggest	
obstacles	to	democratization	and	implementation	of	reforms.	After	three	decades	since	the	Islamic	Revolution,	
there	has	been	some	debate	among	religious	intellectuals	about	what	should	be	the	role	of	religion	in	politics.	
These	issues	touch	the	essence	of	Shi’ism,	and	this	debate	includes	considerations	on	the	level	of	legitimacy	
of	the	Iranian	political	system,	while	it	should	not	be	forgotten	that	Islam	continues	to	play	an	important	role	
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in	the	life	of	most	Iranians	(Rakel,	2009,	pp.26-27).
	 The	foreign	policy	formulation	requires	the	identification	of	the	goals	and	the	means	by	which	it	is	to	be	
implemented.	Both	objectives	and	means,	however,	emanate	from	a	source,	in	which	the	polity	is	originated.	
In	the	West,	or	in	liberal	democracies,	 these	sources	are	generally	regarded	as	an	emanation	people’s	will.	
Governments	derive	 their	mandate	from	the	people	 they	represent.	Theoretically,	every	foreign	policy	 is	
related	to	the	mandate	of	the	Government	that	represents	the	will	of	the	majority.	In	Shi’a	Islam,	however,	the	
source	of	political	decision-making	is	God.	This	difference	between	the	West	and	Shia	Islam	can	be	viewed	
through	the	origins	of	 the	words	“political”	and	“siasat.”	While	 the	first	refers	 to	 the	concern	of	keeping	
people	happy,	 the	second	strives	 to	bring	the	evolution	and	the	development	of	 the	population,	even	if	 it	
means	to	go	against	her	will.	The	majority	of	Shia	scholars	agree	with	this	basic	premise.	Yet	there	are	wide	
disparities	between	the	various	 interpretations	of	 this	concept.	According	to	a	more	radical	 interpretation	
(conservative),	the	will	of	people	must	respect	the	will	of	God,	which	will	be	interpreted	by	religious	jurists.	
The	goals	are	set	and	defined	by	ideology.	The	Western	political	framework	defines,	in	general,	foreign	policy	
objectives	in	terms	of	national	interest.	Shi’a	conservatives	define	its	foreign	policy	goals	in	accordance	with	
the	terms	of	its	doctrine,	as	understood	and	interpreted	by	a	religious	lawyer.	This	may	help	to	explain	the	
goal	set	by	Shah	Ismail	I	in	an	attempt	to	defeat	the	Ottomans.	There	is	no	doubts	about	the	Iranian	objectives	
in	the	context	of	the	Arab-Israeli	conflict	to	have	been	largely	influenced	by	religious	orientation	(Mirbaghari,	
2004,	pp.558-560).
	 Although	God	is	the	source	of	the	polity	to	all	Shiites,	the	foreign	policy	stance	varies	according	to	different	
interpretations.	As	 for	 the	means	and	 tools	by	which	a	policy	must	be	 implemented,	 there	 is	 again	a	
substantial	difference	between	the	Shiites	and	the	West.	Diplomacy	is	based	on	rationality	and	is	the	most	
common	tool	 regarding	 the	 implementation	of	 foreign	policy.	Even	 the	Soviet	 revolutionaries	gradually	
replaced	their	radical	revolutionary	approach	by	conventional	diplomacy,	following	the	October	revolution	of	
1917.	A	conservative	 feature	of	Shi’a	 Islam	 is	 the	 jurisprudence	 that	 replaces	 rationality	as	means	of	
implementing	the	policy.	Even	though	the	political	decision-making	process	does	not	cease	to	be	rational,	the	
reference	point	will	be	the	islamic	jurisprudence	(Mirbaghari,	2004,	pp.560-562).
	 The	central	question	is	whether	the	Shiite	doctrine	is	inherently	compatible	with	the	Iranian	national	interest.	
Shi’ism	follows	the	will	of	God,	jurisprudence	and	ideology.	The	difference	is	clear	in	relation	to	the	Western	
conventional	wisdom	of	adoption	of	people’s	will,	rationality	and	national	interest,	as	means	and	objectives	of	
foreign	policy.	Rationality	is	also	used	in	Shi’a	Islam,	but	generally	in	favor	of	the	doctrine	and	ideology.	
History	has	shown	that	Shia	believes	that	the	best	way	to	serve	the	cause	it	represents,	is	in	the	preservation	
and	survival	of	the	country,	as	well	as	maximizing	its	power.	As	such,	Iran’s	domestic	and	foreign	policy	is	
often	geared	towards	that	goal	in	harmony	with	its	national	interest	(Mirbaghari,	2004,	p.563).
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3.	 The	balance	between	Idealism	and	Pragmatism	in	Iran’s	Foreign	Policy
	 One	possible	way	to	analyze	and	explain	Iranian	foreign	policy	can	be	achieved	through	a	 theoretical	
approach	to	International	Relations	(IR).	The	IR	theory	debate	since	World	War	II,	have	in	general	provided	
the	necessary	tools	for	the	observation	of	international	events,	including	those	related	to	the	Islamic	Republic	
or	the	Middle	East.	Although	foreign	policy	analysis	has	been	included	in	the	scientific	field	of	international	
relations,	this	began	to	emerge	as	a	sub-discipline	through	Richard	Snyder,	H.	W.	Bruck	and	Burton	Sapin,	the	
founding	fathers	of	foreign	policy	analysis.	Despite	having	received	important	contributions	from	the	IR	field,	
foreign	policy	analysis	challenges	great	 theories,	such	as	Idealism	or	Realism.	The	need	for	a	specific	and	
appropriate	approach,	as	the	contradictions	between	existing	theories,	among	other	factors,	resulted	in	the	
emergence	of	this	specific	field.	Nevertheless	foreign	policy	analysts	will	not	be	able	to	say	with	certainty	
what	is	going	on	inside	the	“black	box”	of	states	and	their	foreign	policies	(Snyder,	1962).	A	mature	foreign	
policy	analysis	 is	not	expected	at	 this	point,	but	 the	attempt	 to	do	so	 is	by	itself	an	acceptable	academic	
evolution	in	the	field.	The	study	of	Iranian	foreign	policy,	being	one	of	the	most	complex	case	studies	on	this	
field,	can	assist	in	the	development	of	foreign	policy	analysis	as	sub-discipline	of	international	relations.
	 Revolutions,	even	though	they	are	essentially	internal	affairs	of	a	certain	State,	have	an	effect	on	the	current	
international	system,	breaking	with	the	status quo	and	the	normal	flow	of	diplomacy.	The	religious-based	
revolution	in	Iran	was	no	exception.	This	revolution	dismounted	the	intricate	network	of	relationships	that	
were	sustained	by	the	Pahlavi	monarchy,	and	on	the	other	hand,	determined	priorities	that	are	consistent	with	
the	perceptions	and	values	of	the	revolution	and	the	new	Islamic	Iranian	elite.	The	Iranian	revolution	ended	
the	 reign	of	a	secular,	pro-Western	 regime,	which	 is	 strategically	 important	 to	 the	Middle	East	 region.	
Inevitably	the	waves	that	resulted	from	this	Revolution	were	felt	throughout	the	region,	despite	its	non-Arab	
and	Shiite	characteristics.	Like	other	revolutionary	regimes,	Tehran	was	determined	to	encourage	the	growth	
of	its	ideology	and	“export”	it	whenever	possible.	This	regime	emerged	and	consolidated	during	the	Cold	War,	
finding	a	new	place	in	the	rigidity	and	inflexibility	of	 the	bipolar	 international	system.	However,	after	 ten	
years	of	its	creation,	the	slogan	“neither	East,	nor	West”	was	abandoned	to	witness	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	
The	hegemonic	US	and	a	weakened	Russia	had	to	redefine	its	strategic	presence	in	a	new	world	order.	Soon	
Iranian	foreign	policy	was	going	to	reflect	not	only	the	complexities	of	a	revolutionary	state	emerging	in	a	
highly	dynamic	international	environment,	but	also	the	strategic	importance	of	the	Middle	East	region.	Iranian	
foreign	policy	 therefore	addressed	 the	complexities	of	 the	new	post	Cold	War	order,	 along	with	 the	
complexity	and	contradictions	of	the	Islamic	Republic	and	its	own	domestic	policy	(Ehteshami,	2010,	pp.127-
128).
	 In	practice,	Iranian	foreign	policy	has	evolved	towards	a	series	of	pragmatic	decisions,	together	with	some	
ideological	approaches.	In	fact,	Iran’s	international	relations	have	not	been	notably	controversial,	despite	its	
 155The	post	1979	Iranian	Foreign	Policy	
anti-Western	rhetoric.	The	revolutionary	Iran,	despite	its	theocratic	characteristics,	remains	a	relatively	normal	
state	within	the	framework	of	the	definition	of	its	foreign	policy.	Iran	remained	a	loyal	member	of	almost	all	
the	international	organizations	of	which	the	Pahlavi	monarchy	had	also	been	part,	and	in	this	sense,	at	least,	
has	acted	more	like	a	status quo	power	than	a	revolutionary	power	(Ehteshami,	2010,	p.128).	Indeed,	until	the	
late	1990’s,	 Iran	had	also	maintained	a	commercial	pattern	similar	 to	 that	of	 the	old	 regime	 (with	 the	
exception	of	trade	patterns	with	the	United	States).	Trade	relations	with	the	West	dominated	well	into	the	21st	
century.	These	relationships	have	weakened	only	with	gradual	impositions	brought	by	UN	sanctions,	since	
December	2006.	Regarding	the	Muslim	world,	Iran’s	position	has	been	irregular	 in	a	 theoretically	closer	
region	to	its	regional	constituency.	The	irony	of	the	1980’s	stressed	Iran’s	good	relations	with	some	Muslim	
States	of	secular	trend,	such	as	Algeria,	Libya,	and	Syria.	It	is	possible	to	affirm	that	there	wasn’t	a	“Muslim	
World	 first”	 in	 Iranian	 foreign	policy,	despite	 the	 tone	and	open	 Islamic	 rhetoric.	Nevertheless,	 Iran’s	
international	posture	continues	to	concern	the	international	community.	The	mixture	of	religious	nationalism	
and	a	revolutionary	populist	propaganda,	together	with	a	policy	of	opportunism,	anti-Americanism	and	anti-
Zionism,	brought	Iranian	foreign	policy	to	an	aura	of	difficult	understanding	(Ehteshami,	2010,	pp.128-29).
	 The	international	relations	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	may	be	divided	into	four	distinct	periods:	a	period	
of	confrontation	(1980-1989),	a	period	of	accommodation	(1989-1997),	a	period	of	détente	(1997-2005)	and	a	
period	of	rejection	(post-2005).	This	temporal	classification	of	different	stages	of	foreign	policy	is	directly	
linked	to	the	various	leaders/presidencies:	Khomeini	(1980-1989),	Rafsanjani	(1989-1997),	Khatami	(1997-
2005),	and	Ahmadinejad	(2005-).	This	demarcation	should	not	disguise	the	various	elements	of	continuity	of	
Iranian	foreign	policy,	even	in	relation	to	the	policies	of	the	Pahlavi	era.	Similarly,	it	should	not	also	cover	the	
wandering	nature	of	Iran’s	foreign	policy.	In	this	context	The	Economist	wrote	in	March	29th,	2008:	“The	
country’s	foreign	policies	 look	erratic,	 too.	Iran	has	condemned	jihadist	 terrorism,	but	sheltered	al-Qaeda	
fugitives.	 It	has	backed	the	government	of	Iraq’s	prime	minister,	Nuri	al-Maliki,	yet	has	abetted	militias	
opposed	to	him.	It	champions	Muslim	unity	but	creates	division	by	vilifying	pro-Western	Muslim	rulers,	
backing	Shia	factions	and	expecting	Shias	everywhere	to	bow	to	Mr	Khamenei’s	authority.”	(The	Economist,	
2008).
	 The	Iranian	foreign	policy	suffered	many	oscillations	during	 the	past	30	years.	During	 this	period	 the	
revolutionary	regime	developed	its	foreign	policy	based	on	a	balance	between	pragmatic	and	idealistic	views	
of	 international	affairs.	Any	revolutionary	Government	in	its	early	days	develops	a	 tendency	to	pursue	an	
ideological	approach	 to	 its	 foreign	policy.	However,	after	a	period	of	maturation,	some	more	pragmatic	
considerations	are	developed,	as	the	State’s	survival	depends	largely	on	the	realities	of	the	outside	world.	This	
may	explain	the	cooperation	between	the	US	and	Iran,	on	Afghanistan	and	Iraq.	Iranian	leaders	viewed	the	
stability	in	these	two	countries	as	a	vital	factor	for	 their	national	 interest.	Pragmatism	prevailed,	although	
ideology	seems	to	be	a	priority	in	other	cases,	e.g.	when	Iran	has	adopted	a	policy	of	neutrality	in	the	conflict	
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of	Nagorno-Karabakh	between	Armenia,	a	Christian	State,	and	the	Republic	of	Azerbaijan,	an	Islamic	State	
with	a	Shiite	majority.	Nevertheless	it	is	not	the	regime	ideological	fervor	that	validates	Iran’s	aspiration	to	
become	a	major	regional	power.	On	the	contrary,	the	educational	level	of	its	70	million	inhabitants	and	its	
natural	resources	makes	Iran	the	natural	candidate	to	regional	pre-eminence,	strengthening	their	ability	to	play	
a	 leading	 role,	 reflection	of	 its	geopolitical	weight.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	general	perception	of	 Iran	as	a	
revolutionary	country,	its	foreign	policy	is	addressed	and	largely	based	on	its	cultural	heritage	of	moderation	
and	close	regional	ties	(Saghafi-Ameri,	2010,	pp.136-138).
	 To	explain	the	Iranian	foreign	policy	irregularities,	some	scholars	assumed	a	rationalist	position,	which	
argues	that	Iranian	foreign	policy	became	“increasingly	cautious”	since	the	revolution,	 through	a	gradual	
maturation	and	reconsideration	of	the	Iranian	national	 interest.	However	this	approach,	as	Ramazani	says,	
can’t	explain	why	Iranian	foreign	policy	is	“not	linear	or	dialectic,	but	kaleidoscopic.”	This	important	point	
about	Iranian	policymaking	shows	that	the	idealists	of	today	may	be	the	royalists	of	tomorrow,	and	vice	versa.	
The	observation	and	acceptance	of	this	fluid	nature	seems	to	be	an	important	conceptual	step	to	explain	the	
conflicting	elements	in	its	foreign	policy	(Ramazani,	in	Ehsteshami,	2008,	p.28).
	 The	decision-making	process	analysis	and	its	elements	has	been	one	of	the	central	issues	of	the	theories	of	
foreign	policy	analysis.	Some	analysts	try	to	explain	the	contradictory	characteristics	of	Iranian	foreign	policy	
through	the	complexity	and	seeming	chaos	of	 the	Iranian	political	system.	However,	 the	Supreme	Leader	
oversees	this	whole	process	and	often	appeals	to	consensus.	The	result	is	an	inconstant	foreign	policy,	where	
sometimes	dominates	 the	revolutionary	 imperative,	and	on	other	occasions	considers	more	pragmatic	or	
realistic	premises	(Rezaei,	2008,	p.28).	In	this	way,	as	Ramazani	says,	the	balance	between	pragmatism	and	
ideology	at	the	level	of	Iranian	foreign	policy	decision-making	has	been	the	most	persistent,	and	one	of	the	
most	complex	and	difficult	issues	of	Iranian	history,	since	the	6th	century	BC	(Ramazani,	 in	Rezaei,	2008,	
p.29).	By	considering	 the	complex	nature	of	 the	Iranian	hybrid	political	system,	being	simultaneously	a	
republic	and	a	 theocracy,	along	with	 the	balance	between	 ideology	and	pragmatism	as	one	of	 the	most	
persistent	and	intricate	elements	of	the	Islamic	Republic	foreign	policy.	It	is	possible	to	characterize	post	1979	
Iranian	foreign	policy	as	a	form	of	“theocratic	pragmatism,”	a	fluctuation	between	idealism	and	pragmatism	in	
which	religious	considerations	are	an	important	source	of	inspiration	for	decision	makers,	although	rationality	
and	national	interest	prevail.
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